Publication · November 14, 2026

The Strategic Dilemma of a Permanent American Base in Poland

By Adithya Suresh · 25 min read

A policy analysis of Poland's proposed US base, examining sovereignty, NATO integration, burden-sharing and strategic deterrence.

On October 4, 2026, the President’s aide of the Republic of Poland, Marcin Przydacz, informed the White House that it had approved a permanent US base in Poland [1]. Given the current geopolitical climate, with sporadic yet frequent drone incursions into Polish airspace from the Russian Federation—particularly over the Lubelskie and Podkarpackie voivodeships [2]—the proposal may appear strategically sound for a state on the front line of an adversary whose military instruments have made frequent incursions of late. It nevertheless presents Warsaw with a dilemma over the strategic implications.

The proposed base is expected to station around 5,000 troops in Poland, with plans to locate it in the west of the country, near the German border.

The US currently stations around 10,000 troops in Poland, with facilities in Poznań, Bolesławiec, Powidz, Redzikowo and Bemowo Piskie. These serve a variety of purposes, primarily supporting US and NATO defence interests, including an Army combat aviation brigade [3].

Camp Kościuszko in Poznań functions as the permanent US Army headquarters on NATO’s eastern flank. It hosts US Army Garrison Poland (USAG-P) and the forward headquarters of the US Army’s V Corps. The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Site in Redzikowo is a permanent US Navy installation that became operational in late 2023 or early 2024 and serves as a key part of NATO’s ballistic missile defence system.

Current US Army personnel in Poland operate on a rotational basis. The proposal aims to permanently station an additional 5,000 troops, supported by community infrastructure such as family housing, schools and hospitals for military families. Compared with rotational deployments, permanent troops may offer advantages through stronger interoperability with Poland’s armed forces and deeper local knowledge, including familiarity with the terrain.

Because Poland and the United States are both NATO members, the proposed base would be governed in part by NATO agreements, including the North Atlantic Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA defines the legal status of US military personnel, civilian staff and their dependants while stationed in Poland.

Jurisdiction under NATO SOFA

Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides:

ARTICLE VII

…

2.1. The military authorities of the sending state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that state with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending state, but not by the law of the receiving state.

2.2. The authorities of the receiving state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependants with respect to offences relating to the security of that state punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending state.

…

3.2. In the case of any other offence, the authorities of the receiving state shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. [4]

Under the NATO agreement, the sending state can exercise jurisdiction over offences arising from acts or omissions performed in the course of official duty. This can give it significant authority in cases involving its personnel.

If a US soldier harms another person or damages property at the proposed base, Poland may have limited jurisdiction despite being the host country and contributing substantially to the base’s construction and development.

The flexible definition of “official duty” may blur the boundaries of jurisdiction and justice, particularly when the sending state determines whether an act was performed in an official capacity. This interpretation could affect remedies available to civilians or others harmed by an act, and could limit Polish jurisdiction under domestic law.

The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement

The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland on Enhanced Defence Cooperation (EDCA) provides a more specific framework for the establishment of US military facilities in Poland, including the proposed permanent base, alongside the NATO framework.

ARTICLE 5 — SUPPORT TO U.S. FORCES PRESENCE

…

The presence of U.S. forces in the territory of the Republic of Poland strengthens NATO’s deterrence efforts, the defence of the United States and the commitment of the United States to the security and defence of the Republic of Poland. The Parties agree to the special measures regarding the enduring presence of U.S. forces in the territory of the Republic of Poland described in Annex B.

…

ARTICLE 14 — CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

…

Therefore, at the request of the United States and in furtherance of its commitment to mutual defence, the Republic of Poland hereby exercises its sovereign discretion to waive the Republic of Poland’s primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction as provided by Article VII, Paragraph 3(c), of the NATO SOFA. In specific cases of particular importance to the Republic of Poland, the authorities of the Republic of Poland may withdraw the waiver by providing a statement in writing to the competent U.S. forces authorities not later than thirty (30) days after receipt of the notification described in Paragraph 2 of this Article.

…

8. Cooperation concerning assistance in carrying out all necessary investigations into offences, as referred to in Article VII, Paragraph 6(a), of the NATO SOFA, shall be carried out, whenever possible, directly among the authorities responsible for conducting the requested activities. [5]

These provisions illustrate how Poland may cede some authority to US forces. The EDCA frames the enduring US presence as a commitment to Poland’s security, while the agreement’s criminal-jurisdiction provisions permit Poland to waive its primary jurisdiction in specified cases and to withdraw that waiver within a 30-day period. The framing as a “commitment,” rather than an “obligation” or “duty,” also raises questions about how durable the assurance may be across changes in US administrations.

Reliance on the NATO SOFA provisions may require Warsaw to cede some legal authority to US forces. The conditional 30-day withdrawal period could complicate timely prosecution of conduct that may be actionable under Polish law.

The NATO SOFA is a multilateral agreement, while the EDCA is bilateral. Together, their provisions may transfer or limit elements of Polish sovereignty in the operation of the base.

ARTICLE 30 — SECURITY

1. The authorities of the Parties shall cooperate closely to ensure the protection, safety and security of U.S. forces, U.S. contractors, U.S. contractor employees and dependants. Within its capabilities, the Republic of Poland shall take such measures as are reasonable and necessary to ensure such protection, safety and security. The Parties recognise that the Republic of Poland has overall responsibility to provide security within its territory.

2. The Republic of Poland hereby recognises that U.S. forces have all the rights and authorities necessary for U.S. forces’ use, operation, defence or control of agreed facilities and areas, including taking appropriate measures to maintain or restore order and to protect U.S. forces, U.S. contractor employees and dependants. U.S. forces shall coordinate security plans and intend to coordinate such measures with the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Poland. [5]

Article 30 underscores the additional burden a permanent base may place on Poland’s resources. Poland undertakes responsibility for security within its territory, including the safety of stationed personnel and their dependants, while recognising the “rights and authorities” necessary for US forces to use, operate, defend or control agreed facilities and areas. The agreement also provides for coordination with Polish authorities.

The authority to determine appropriate measures to maintain or restore order and protect US personnel raises questions about whose interests the base primarily serves. The permanent presence may function as a deterrent and extend US defensive capacity within NATO territory, while also serving US interests abroad.

The agreement allows for coordination with Warsaw on security plans, though it leaves room for interpretation about what measures require coordination. It does not expressly grant US forces unrestricted authority to use force throughout Poland.

Polish Domestic Law and Tax Treatment

Chapter 3 — Subjective Exemptions

Article 21

…

46c) Income obtained by a contract contractor within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defence Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on 15 August 2020 (Journal of Laws, items 2153 and 2154), having a place of residence in the territory of the Republic of Poland, from the supply of goods and services to the US armed forces within the meaning of Article 2(a) of that Agreement, or from the construction of infrastructure for those armed forces under a contract or subcontract concluded with or on behalf of those forces. [6]

Polish domestic law, through the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw), provides for tax exemptions for contractors involved in constructing US military installations. While qualifying income may be exempt from Polish taxation, the provision illustrates the state’s willingness to support the US armed forces’ presence for strategic rather than direct monetary benefit, despite Poland’s substantial financial investment.

Article 1

…

3. The provisions of this Act defining the status of foreign armed forces shall not apply to foreign armed forces whose status is defined in international agreements ratified in accordance with Article 89(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997.

…

Article 11

1. Subject to reciprocity, the sending state shall be exempt from liability for damage to property owned by the State Treasury and used by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, caused by foreign armed forces, their soldiers or civilian personnel, if the damage was caused while performing tasks related to the objectives specified in the consent.

…

Article 12

The provisions of Article 11(1) shall apply accordingly to damage caused by foreign armed forces, their soldiers or civilian personnel to soldiers or civilian employees of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. [7]

Under Poland’s 1999 Act on the Presence of Foreign Armed Forces in the Territory of the Republic of Poland, the status of foreign troops and responsibility for certain damage may be governed by ratified international agreements. The ratification of the EDCA and NATO SOFA could therefore affect the application of domestic provisions in specific circumstances.

This interpretation does not mean Polish domestic law is wholly inapplicable. Rather, the NATO SOFA and EDCA may displace or qualify particular domestic rules on criminal jurisdiction, taxation and procedures for damage claims. Stationed troops are generally expected to respect Polish sovereignty and applicable Polish laws.

ARTICLE 91

1. After promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw), a ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute.

2. An international agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes.

3. If an agreement ratified by the Republic of Poland establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of conflict of laws.

…

ARTICLE 117

The principles of deployment of the Armed Forces beyond the borders of the Republic of Poland shall be specified by a ratified international agreement or by statute. The principles for the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland and the principles for their movement within that territory shall be specified by ratified agreements or statutes. [8]

Under the Polish Constitution, a ratified agreement such as the EDCA may take precedence over domestic statutory provisions where the two cannot be reconciled. Article 117 specifically provides that the presence and movement of foreign troops on Polish territory are governed by ratified agreements or statutes. These provisions may give ratified agreements legal priority over conflicting domestic rules under Article 91(2).

The establishment of a base may serve as a strategic deterrent for Warsaw by raising the potential cost of an attack through the prospect of US involvement. It may also reinforce Poland’s commitment to the wider transatlantic military framework. Permanently stationed American troops could improve coordination with the US armed forces on military cooperation and operational procedures related to Poland’s defence.

The Case of a Neighbour, an Ally and a Trading Partner

Like the proposal to station as many as 5,000 American troops on Polish territory, Germany hosts a substantial permanent US military presence. Estimates place the number at around 35,000–39,000 soldiers across approximately 20 major sites, primarily in the south and southwest of the country. These facilities are largely US Army garrisons and US Air Force installations [9].

Unlike Poland, whose US installations largely date from the post-1989 period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of Germany’s bases originated during the Cold War. At the time, West Germany was a frontline state facing the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Despite Germany’s position as a major European defence power and its sizeable air force, the US presence also provides a base for US European Command (EUCOM) and supports NATO operations and coordination in Europe.

Germany no longer serves as a frontline state for US quick-reaction missions in the same way. Buffer states separate it from many potential threats, reducing its exposure to immediate short-range artillery or border incursions. Nevertheless, Germany has faced the prospect of US troop withdrawals [10], even as it hosts a significant share of NATO infrastructure in Europe. This debate has partly coincided with Germany’s stronger emphasis on European defence commitments and the use of European alternatives for some military equipment, which may not always align with transatlantic interests.

In this context, locating a permanent American base in western Poland, close to the German border, may offer limited immediate deterrence value to Poland beyond logistical benefits. Its proximity to existing bases in southeastern Germany may make it more useful as part of a regional network than as a distinct forward deterrent for Warsaw.

The base could still support reinforcement, troop movement and the wider garrison network, including existing installations in western Poland. From this perspective, it may function as an extension of a logistical hub, even if its immediate deterrence value is limited.

South Korea: A Frontline Ally

On the eastern side of Eurasia, South Korea offers another comparison. It is a regional power with substantial economic and military capacity, and shares a border with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

South Korea has hosted US forces since the Korean War and the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Though far below the roughly 300,000 troops present in the area between 1950 and 1953 [11], the country now hosts around 28,500 personnel under US Forces Korea (USFK) [12].

South Korea is central to Washington’s efforts to deter the DPRK, whose expanding nuclear and ballistic missile programmes Pyongyang claims could reach distant territories, including the US mainland, at ranges of up to 15,000 kilometres [13]. The programme presents a growing threat, subject to further developments in North Korea’s missile capabilities.

Despite the direct threat North Korea may pose to the United States, political differences between the current administrations of South Korea and the US, as well as economic tensions, have coincided with discussion of withdrawing American forces [14] and the recent withdrawal from military exercises with South Korea [15].

The two countries have a mutual defence agreement dating from the Korean War. Although the agreement has remained largely unchanged since its ratification in 1954, it grants the US rights concerning the disposition of its forces in South Korea under mutually agreed terms [16]. This does not necessarily mean that South Korea has ceded its legal sovereignty. Rather, US forces retain operational autonomy over their own activities while remaining distinct from the Republic of Korea’s command structure.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Since 1991, the two countries have also signed Special Measures Agreements (SMAs). The latest, signed on November 4, 2024, under the Biden administration, covers the 2026–2030 period. The 12th SMA concerns Seoul’s financial contribution to the annual costs of maintaining US forces in South Korea [17]. The United States also exerts influence on South Korean defence policy through these arrangements.

As in Poland, these agreements shape the balance between sovereignty and strategic cooperation. South Korea has not had to bear the entire financial burden for the troops and infrastructure on its territory. The deterrent presence, alongside the DPRK’s own economic constraints, has raised the potential cost of conflict for Pyongyang. It has also allowed South Korea to focus on economic and domestic priorities during key periods of its post-independence development.

The continuing US presence on the Korean Peninsula has supported conditions for sustained economic growth and the development of South Korea’s armed forces through knowledge-sharing and cooperation. South Korea has also built its own defence industrial base, and its weapons are now supplied to Poland.

According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), between 2016 and 2019 the US Department of Defense (DoD) obligated approximately $13.4 billion for its presence in South Korea. The South Korean government funded $5.8 billion over the same period, covering military personnel, operations and maintenance, family housing operations and construction, and military construction [18].

The report identifies benefits of the US presence, including support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, contingency response, and regional stability and security. South Korea also hosts the largest US overseas military base. The spending figures illustrate a burden-sharing arrangement in which the host country contributes to the presence without necessarily carrying an equal share of its total cost.

At first glance, South Korea may appear to be an example of Legal Cessionism. Closer examination, however, suggests that legal sovereignty can remain intact even where strategic autonomy is constrained.

Saudi Arabia: Hosting Without a Permanent Base

Saudi Arabia presents a different case. It does not host a permanent US military base, but the history of US air base operations in the kingdom raises questions about how much deterrence a foreign military presence can provide when an adversary is willing to strike targets on host-country territory.

The two countries have existing arrangements for defence assistance. US forces currently use an air base in Saudi Arabia on a non-permanent or rotational basis, following the closure of their permanent headquarters in the kingdom in 2003. This continuing presence raises the question of what constitutes deterrence when US forces are stationed in a third country.

In 2025, the US administration signed a Strategic Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Although the agreement has not been made public, it was reported to seek stronger regional deterrence and growth in the defence industrial base through increased arms purchases by Riyadh [19].

Saudi Arabia is a distinctive case because it is not a NATO member. The deterrent capacity of the US presence came under significant strain during the US–Israel conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2026 [20]. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reportedly targeted US military assets in Saudi Arabia [21]. Hosting US forces exposed Saudi territory to attack, even though the kingdom’s role in the conflict and the scope of its alliance with Washington were limited.

Iran’s targeting of US military assets in Saudi Arabia reflected the fact that those assets were located on Saudi territory and could be viewed as a direct threat by Tehran. The air base’s presence therefore contributed to Saudi Arabia being targeted, despite the kingdom not directing the conflict’s outcome.

The Saudi case illustrates the limits of deterrence in the absence of a permanent base and a collective-defence framework. Unlike South Korea and Germany, Saudi Arabia does not benefit from a mechanism such as NATO Article 5, which could provide a unified response and raise the potential cost of aggression. Despite hosting US forces, the relationship may be viewed as having considerable commercial importance through arms sales, alongside strategic cooperation.

The Saudi example adds another variable: a foreign military presence may create an additional target profile even when the host country is not otherwise involved in a confrontation with the adversary.

The Polish Variant

The proposal for a Polish base would require changes to the current strategy and to the proposed location of a permanent American presence. Under the concept of Legal Cessionism, Poland would exchange some strategic discretion for the stationing of NATO forces on its territory.

This model questions whether stationing additional American troops in Poland would provide a distinct strategic benefit, given the country’s existing commitments and NATO membership, whose collective-defence framework already serves as a deterrent against potential adversaries.

The cases examined in this article suggest that an American base in a non-NATO state may attract attention and provoke a kinetic response from an adversary concerned about the consequences of its presence, as illustrated by reported targeting of American assets in Saudi Arabia.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict remains fragile amid the current political climate in the United States [22], which may influence US actions abroad, including in Poland.

If the Polish government proceeds with a permanent American base, it could consider locating it within the Masovian region. This could help maintain a credible deterrent for Poland’s survival while reducing the exposure of American personnel to immediate risks near the eastern border. A central location could also preserve operational reach across the country.

Warsaw is near Poland’s geographic centre and has infrastructure that connects it with the rest of the country. It is also the seat of the US diplomatic mission. A base in the wider region could support rapid communication and coordination with Polish authorities during a crisis.

A base in or near Warsaw could create logistical challenges for US forces. One option would be a site in the Masovian Voivodeship beyond city limits, similar to the 23rd Tactical Air Base in Minsk Mazowiecki [23]. This could support operations while helping protect civilians if the installation were targeted.

Poland has also lost a capable fighter aircraft in its ageing MiG-29 fleet [24]. The country could consider hosting an additional air squadron for Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) missions as part of NATO infrastructure. A squadron equipped with Boeing F-15EX Eagle II aircraft could provide fast interception capability and demonstrate allied resolve in response to incursions into Polish airspace.

Poland currently operates F-16 fighter jets, which may take over the MiG-29’s interceptor role after retirement. The proposed F-15EX has a stated top speed of Mach 2.5 [25], compared with Mach 2.0 for the F-16 [26]. Both aircraft have a listed climb rate of around 50,000 feet per minute.

The aircraft also differ in service ceiling: approximately 60,000 feet for the F-15EX, compared with 50,000 feet for the F-16. The F-15EX’s higher service ceiling and speed could make it useful for interception missions.

The F-15EX can carry a substantially heavier weapons load, approximately 13,300–13,400 kilograms compared with around 7,700–9,275 kilograms for the F-16. The greater maximum payload provides flexibility across mission configurations, although the number and type of weapons carried would depend on the mission and their integration with the aircraft.

The F-15EX’s twin engines may also offer an operational safety margin over challenging terrain and in severe weather, including the range of conditions from Polish summers to harsh winters.

Under this proposal, the fleet could operate through a jointly managed arrangement, in light of the recent increase in sporadic drone incidents over Polish territory and the political signal such cooperation could send. The agreement could allocate a share of operating costs to Warsaw, while the United States finances its own defence equipment in line with NATO’s Eastern Flank programme, US requirements and Poland’s national-security needs.

The Saudi case highlights how a foreign military asset can create an additional target profile. A permanent base should therefore operate as part of the wider NATO network rather than as an isolated overseas installation of the US armed forces. Under this approach, US commanders would retain authority over the deployment of American personnel and US assets.

Even if the installation operates within the wider NATO network, its legal arrangements would be governed by the bilateral EDCA. The EDCA supplements the NATO SOFA, which remains relevant to matters not displaced by the EDCA’s provisions.

Assigning the base a defined role within the NATO network could ensure that relevant decisions follow NATO processes rather than a unilateral command structure that may not account for immediate second-order effects.

The jointly operated fleet could have a separate financial arrangement distinguishing the base’s operating costs and shared capabilities, to which Warsaw would contribute an agreed share, from the defence equipment itself, which would remain US-funded. This arrangement would be separate from Poland’s existing commitments under Annex B, Section III of the EDCA concerning Poland-Provided Logistics Support (PPLS), and from the parties’ respective rights and obligations under Article 27 on telecommunications.

This structure would account for Poland’s existing financial commitments to constructing and developing military infrastructure, while allowing the United States to finance aircraft and associated equipment in line with its defence priorities and NATO’s Eastern Flank security requirements.

The proposed structure could help Warsaw manage the political vulnerabilities of a bilateral base while deterring threats to Polish territory and its political centre, without placing a disproportionate bilateral burden on Polish taxpayers.

Sources Consulted

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