Publication · August 5, 2026

The MiG-29 Gambit

By Adithya Suresh · 12 min read

A defence policy analysis examining whether Poland can convert its retiring MiG-29 fleet into long-term military, industrial and strategic advantage.

Against the backdrop of the return of the Order of the White Eagle, Warsaw pursued an agreement reached in principle a year earlier: the Polish Armed Forces and defence industry would gain access to Ukraine’s extensive battlefield experience with drones in exchange for Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets [1].

In chess, a gambit involves sacrificing material in exchange for a positional advantage. Poland’s opportunity is similar: it involves an operational capability that is depreciating, whose strategic value may lie less in continued service than in the long-term industrial and defence gains it could secure.

Poland’s Defence Minister said that “Warsaw remained ready to hand over Soviet-era aircraft provided Ukraine shares its expertise in unmanned combat systems” [2].

Ukraine’s drone expertise is a valuable strategic asset, given the similarities in terrain and the rapid advances in drone warfare. It could help Poland address vulnerabilities such as the Suwałki Gap [3], a 104-kilometre land corridor between Poland and Lithuania, situated between Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus.

Ukraine’s demonstrated resilience against waves of Russian drone attacks could also allow Warsaw to study Russian tactics and prepare for potential future attacks. This expertise could help Poland intercept drone signals and establish a layered interception system to protect vulnerabilities exposed by the September 2025 drone incursions into Polish territory [4].

Information about subsequent developments in Moscow’s systems could improve locally developed drone defences. A deeper understanding of signal characteristics—including electromagnetic emissions, reflections and heat signatures [5]—could support detection and intervention, potentially including methods to intercept or decode signals before drones reach their targets.

A Bulgarian Pathway

After the obstacles encountered in negotiations between Poland and Ukraine [6], Warsaw has an opportunity to pursue an alternative route for transferring or exchanging its MiG-29s. Bulgaria is currently one of two EU members that still operate the aircraft in its air force.

Given Sofia’s earlier difficulties with the cost of maintaining its MiG-29 fleet [7], Warsaw could negotiate a commercial exchange that lets Bulgaria cannibalize decommissioned aircraft for parts to sustain its remaining fleet. Keeping ageing MiGs in Polish hangars would continue to cost taxpayers through maintenance, security and storage.

As an alternative to the existing non-commercial negotiations with Ukraine, Bulgaria offers Poland an opportunity to advance its strategic interests through two possible pathways. As the MiG-29’s operational utility and bargaining value decline, a decision may become more urgent.

One option is a commercial exchange with Bulgaria for monetary value. Given the age and maintenance demands of the MiG-29, Bulgaria could maintain its existing aircraft through parts cannibalization, a common practice among air forces balancing cost and operational effectiveness.

A European Path

By exchanging the fighter jets with Bulgaria for commercial value, Warsaw could replace its ageing MiG-29 fleet and address capability gaps.

Poland could consider acquiring Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as a complement to its US-origin F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-35 Lightning II jets and South Korean KAI FA-50s. These aircraft were part of an earlier 2023 modernization plan, with deliveries scheduled through 2028 [8]. The Eurofighter Typhoon may offer Warsaw a distinct opportunity.

Poland could potentially secure significant technology transfer, particularly because of the open-source character of the Eurofighter programme. Aircraft availability could also allow a timely replacement for the existing fleet of 14 MiG-29s [9].

The programme could expand operational capability by allowing Poland to reprogramme mission data files independently according to military requirements. This customizability could enable the aircraft to be configured with different defence systems and technologies from multiple manufacturers.

Operationally, the Eurofighter Typhoon could fill a gap as an intervention aircraft, with a stated top speed of 2,495 km/h [10]. Its speed and capabilities could suit interceptor missions.

The aircraft could also be deployed for Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) missions, an increasingly relevant role in Polish airspace. A rapid response from the Typhoon could provide time to deploy slower but more advanced fifth-generation F-35 fighters [11], whose stealth capabilities reduce radar signatures and radar cross-sections against modern aircraft such as the Su-57, Su-30 and MiG-29.

This could create a layered surveillance and response capability across the FA-50, F-16, F-35 Lightning II and Typhoon fleets. Their differing specifications and technical requirements would give Poland several operational options.

Alternatively, Poland could keep the MiG-29s in service for a few more years. This would add costs to the defence budget, as the aircraft approach the end of their operational lives and may require equipment overhauls and structural airframe improvements.

Retaining the jets without pursuing either pathway could mean rising maintenance costs and declining capability. Although they could continue interception missions, their usefulness in future operations remains uncertain, despite potential advantages in swarm formations.

Maintaining the ageing MiG-29 fleet may not deliver meaningful operational or strategic benefit. Its short-range missiles and older N019 pulse-Doppler radar may be unable to reliably track or engage threats beyond 100 kilometres [12].

The radar may also be vulnerable to modern electronic countermeasures (ECM), limiting the aircraft’s effectiveness against contemporary tactics in which fighter jets engage from within their own territory using stand-off missiles.

Reliance on Russia for engine overhauls and components further weighs against keeping the Soviet aircraft, given current political tensions and the need to defend Polish territorial sovereignty.

The Eurofighter programme could offer options for local manufacturing and rights to maintain, repair and build components at state-owned PGZ facilities. This could build on Poland’s existing capacity to maintain F-16 aircraft, as described in the Polish Defence and Security Equipment Catalogue 2024 [13].

Expanded manufacturing capacity could follow from independent production rights and a stronger industrial base developed through aircraft maintenance. The Eurofighter consortium has offered industrial participation through PGZ [14], potentially opening additional revenue from component exports.

“It is thereby acknowledged, the programme through the consortium does not allow final manufacturing rights or localized assembly line exclusively for the airframe.”

Manufacturing selected core components could also provide transferable skills for other military and dual-use technologies, including advanced composites, high-temperature alloys and precision machining. These capabilities could support the development of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and loyal wingman systems.

The move could signal strategic diversification in Poland’s fighter fleet and alignment with European interests. However, acquiring the Eurofighter Typhoon could complicate maintenance across the existing fleet, increase costs and create interoperability challenges among the different aircraft types in Polish service.

It could also create high-value aerospace jobs in Poland, including sensitive defence and defence-adjacent sectors. Sustained procurement, maintenance and export demand could support domestic employment and help offset some of the initial cost difference through direct and indirect tax revenue over the coming decade.

Technical expertise in software and composite manufacturing could also support future combat systems, including UCAVs and loyal wingman drones. Advances in carbon-fibre composites could provide benefits for domestic systems such as the Borsuk infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).

A Soviet Swap

Another pathway would be a Soviet-for-Soviet hardware exchange, in which Warsaw trades its fighter jets for an S-300 surface-to-air missile system. This high-value exchange could establish a layered air-defence system alongside existing US-made Patriot missile systems and the older Soviet-era S-200 systems previously operated by Poland.

The S-300 architecture could allow Poland to reverse-engineer [15] and reprogramme command systems and launchers, potentially integrating domestic electronic capabilities to intercept threats in Polish airspace, subject to constraints in the missile’s original design and guidance architecture [16]. Familiarity among the armed forces with the S-200 could also support integration into the existing defence network, following its recent declassification by the armed forces in July 2026 [17].

This pathway could add an intermediate air-defence capability and strengthen the wider system. Unlike the European pathway, a technology exchange might provide defensive capacity without the same level of perceived escalation.

The S-300 system is based on Soviet-era technology, raising questions about its effectiveness against modern missiles in a post-Cold War environment. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran conflict, Tehran reportedly faced significant challenges defending its territory [18] against Israeli hypersonic missiles and US-made Patriot systems, which Poland also operates.

Adversaries familiar with S-300 systems could potentially exploit their weaknesses. Even with reduced capabilities, however, the system could improve on Poland’s previous S-200 infrastructure, developed during the Cold War [19].

In a hypothetical multi-theatre crisis involving the United States, advanced systems such as Patriot may be subject to proprietary software and end-user monitoring agreements. Such arrangements could create diplomatic leverage over their use or redeployment, as reported during the current US–Israel–Iran conflict [20].

An S-300 system on Polish territory would not be subject to the same external oversight. Poland’s ability to control a missile system on its own territory could provide greater strategic leverage than some other systems.

A modernized, layered air-defence network with multiple surface-to-air missile (SAM) options could also help prevent incidents such as the recent missile strike in the Lublin region, where a Russian-origin missile struck Polish soil amid the war in Ukraine [21].

Poland could use expertise gained from the project to advance its defence ambitions into the 2030s, including research and development of indigenous missile systems and potentially air-to-air missiles for its current aircraft fleet, reducing dependence on foreign munitions.

Given the current negotiation timeline and Ukraine’s additional requests for weapons beyond the MiG-29s agreed in principle, Warsaw could set a firm 30-day deadline for negotiations with Kyiv. The ageing aircraft are losing value and bargaining power over time.

To maintain strategic leverage, Warsaw could also open confidential negotiations with the Bulgarian government on a mutually beneficial commercial arrangement. This would allow Poland to use the MiG-29s as a gambit for a stronger strategic position.

Sources Consulted

1. “Poland says Ukraine has offered drones in exchange for MiG-29 fighter jets.” PolskieRadio.pl. Retrieved August 2, 2026. PolskieRadio.pl.
2. “Poland wants Ukrainian drone tech in exchange for MiG-29 jets: deputy PM.” PolskieRadio.pl. Retrieved July 20, 2026. PolskieRadio.pl.
3. Howard, G. E., & Wojcik, R. (2026, February 11). “How Poland and Lithuania are defending the Suwałki Corridor.” The National Interest. Retrieved August 2, 2026. The National Interest.
4. Suresh, A. (2025, October 23). “Russian drone incursions over Poland: What they reveal about Europe’s airspace security.” Medium. Retrieved August 2, 2026. Medium.
5. Rahman, S., & Robertson, D. A. (2018). “Radar micro-Doppler signatures of drones and birds at K-band and W-band.” Nature. doi:10.1038/s41598-018-35880-9.
6. Mykhailenko, D. (2026, July 10). “Poland and Ukraine reopen MiG-29 fighter jet-for-drones negotiations.” UNITED24 Media. UNITED24 Media.
7. Aerospace Global News. (2026, January 16). “Bulgaria struggles with cost to maintain ageing MiG-29s and Su-25s amid F-16 transition.” AGN.
8. “Poland’s FA-50 jets set for combat duty in 2026 as training accelerates.” Defensemirror.com. Retrieved August 2, 2026. Defense Mirror.
9. Popilnichenko, K. (2026, July 2). “Poland will decommission remaining MiG-29 jets intended for Ukraine.” UNITED24 Media. UNITED24 Media.
10. Eurofighter. “Performance.” Retrieved July 31, 2026. Eurofighter.
11. Lockheed Martin. “5th Gen Capabilities.” Retrieved August 2, 2026. F-35.
12. Du Fretay, H. (2026, August 1). “Poland considers MiG-29 fighter transfer to Ukraine for battle-tested drone technologies.” Army Recognition. Retrieved August 2, 2026. Army Recognition.
13. “Polish Defence and Security Equipment Catalogue 2024.” (2024). National Security Bureau (BBN), Ministry of National Defence. Retrieved July 31, 2026. BBN (PDF).
14. Sabak, J., & Cimachaviec, A. (2024, September 25). “Udział w konsorcjum Eurofighter dla Polski? Jest oferta szerokiej współpracy przemysłowej i wojskowej.” Portal Obronny. Retrieved July 31, 2026. Portal Obronny.
15. “Iran unveils self-developed knockoff of S-300 missiles.” (2015, April 18). The Times of Israel. Retrieved August 5, 2026. The Times of Israel.
16. Newdick, T. (2022, July 9). “Russia now firing S-300 surface-to-air missiles at land targets in Ukraine: official.” TWZ. TWZ.
17. “Patriot PAC-3 missiles and S-200 systems: Poland reveals lists of military aid to Ukraine.” Militarnyi. Retrieved July 31, 2026. Militarnyi.
18. “How U.S. and Israeli forces prepared intensely for years to take out Iran’s S-300 air defences.” (2026, March 5). Military Watch Magazine. Retrieved August 2, 2026. Military Watch Magazine.
19. Wade, M. (2019). “S-200.” Encyclopedia Astronautica. Retrieved August 2, 2026. Encyclopedia Astronautica.
20. “Poland says Patriot batteries will stay put after report of US Middle East request.” PolskieRadio.pl. Retrieved August 1, 2026. PolskieRadio.pl.
21. “Expert says Russia may have deliberately directed missile toward Poland.” (2026, July 30). PolskieRadio.pl. Retrieved July 31, 2026. PolskieRadio.pl.

← Back to publicationsRead on Medium