Publication · June 20, 2026
Parallel Visits, Parallel Orders: Strategic Signalling in an Emerging Multipolar System
By Adithya Suresh · 17 min read
An analysis of the Beijing Summit and BRICS Ministers Meeting as parallel tracks shaping an emerging multipolar order.
On May 14, the US–China summit between the President of the United States and the President of the People’s Republic of China covered a range of interests. The talks took place against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East during the two-day summit.
Approximately 3,800 kilometres southwest, in New Delhi, BRICS foreign ministers met between May 14 and 15 under India’s chairmanship.
Most analyses of May 2026 treated the meetings as unrelated diplomatic events. This article argues that the parallel visits can instead be viewed as parallel responses to the same reality: managing interdependence in an emerging multipolar system.
Beijing: Managing Interdependence through Strategic Accommodation
The governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China signed an extensive economic and trade agreement. Three elements of the agreement stand out.
In agricultural trade, Beijing agreed to allow “fortified milk produced in the United States to be imported into China subject to China’s National Food Safety Standard…” and to allow “such product to be labelled and sold to consumers as ‘pasteurized-modified milk’ provided the product is pasteurized.”
“5. … China also continues to have the right to conduct inspections of a risk-based selection of shipments of U.S. dairy and infant formula products at the port of entry. If China determines, based on scientific inspection, that a particular shipment of U.S. dairy or infant formula products is in violation of applicable food safety import requirements, China may refuse importation of that shipment.”
According to the US Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service, US dairy exports are valued at more than $9.51 billion, of which China accounts for $523.2 million. Revisions to Chinese regulations allowing US dairy imports mark a significant change in policy while potentially increasing export revenue.
China’s allowance of US infant formula also signals a calibrated acceptance of imported brands, at a time when the product category has faced growing consumer trust concerns.
This acceptance is reinforced by China’s difficulty in producing enough infant formula to meet domestic demand.
At the same time, China retains the right to conduct risk-based inspections of US dairy and infant-formula shipments and refuse entry when products violate applicable food-safety import rules. Infant formula remains among the most trust-sensitive consumer goods because of past safety scandals. Easing imports signals controlled openness, while retaining risk-based inspection rights reasserts regulatory sovereignty in line with state interests.
In agricultural biotechnology, both parties agreed:
“To carry out exchanges on agricultural biotechnology and intend to take steps to enhance engagement with the public concerning agricultural biotechnology and public awareness of scientific information relevant to agricultural biotechnology, with the aim of building public confidence in, and acceptance of, the use of biotechnology in agriculture and the food system.”
Public engagement on biotechnology serves a shared goal: addressing entrenched narratives and public skepticism about agricultural biotechnology. Such coordination could help both parties counter misinformation while paving the way for broader market acceptance.
Article 4.3 — Credit Rating Services
“China affirms that a wholly U.S.-owned credit rating services supplier has been allowed to rate domestic bonds sold to domestic and international investors, including for the interbank market. China commits that it shall continue to allow U.S. service suppliers, including wholly U.S.-owned credit rating services, to rate all types of domestic bonds sold to domestic and international investors… China shall review and approve any pending license applications of U.S. service suppliers to provide credit rating services.”
Opening Chinese financial markets to wholly US-owned credit-rating services contrasts sharply with reciprocal tariffs on US-origin goods and services.
Embedding American credit-rating agencies could lend their credibility to Chinese markets and domestically issued bonds, encouraging international investment despite tariff instability.
This mechanism could make Chinese bonds’ risk more readily assessed instead of leaving ratings solely to state-owned agencies. Internationalizing bond ratings could also reduce the risk of domestic capital flight and support the yuan’s role in global trade.
“China approved an initial purchase of 200 American-made Boeing aircraft for Chinese airlines. This tranche of aircraft—China’s first commitment to purchase American-made Boeing aircraft since 2017—will drive high-paying, high-skilled U.S. manufacturing jobs and enable the Chinese people to fly on American-made planes for decades to come.”
The strategic pivot toward Boeing aircraft represents a shift in priorities in the Chinese domestic market, despite the availability of a state-backed alternative, the COMAC C919, built by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (COMAC).
The specific Boeing models ordered have not been disclosed. This leaves room for speculation about how China’s choices may be affected by pending European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certification and potentially future FAA approval, given that the aircraft use engines from US-based GE Aerospace.
Geopolitical tensions and low production numbers at the state-owned manufacturer may also have influenced China’s reconsideration of American airliners. Beijing has set five-year goals to increase production and develop indigenous engines, reducing reliance on external manufacturers.
“The two countries reached agreements concerning China’s purchase of aircraft as well as U.S. guarantees for the supply of aircraft engines and related parts to China. The two sides agreed to continue advancing cooperation in relevant areas.”
By seeking US guarantees for components, Beijing aims to manage vulnerabilities in its supply chain. For Washington, guaranteeing the parts while securing a major order for 200 Boeing aircraft preserves structural leverage over China’s civil aviation sector.
“Both leaders agreed Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, called to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and agreed that no country or organisation can be allowed to charge tolls.”
The tactical concessions in Beijing reflect a calculated effort to manage acute structural vulnerabilities in a Western-dominated global system. As these interdependent trade arrangements were being finalized with Washington, a parallel order was being negotiated 3,800 kilometres away in New Delhi.
New Delhi and BRICS: The Building Blocks of an Emerging Alternative
The May 14–15 BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting represents an architectural counterweight to Western leverage for China and its partners, while actively building financial and diplomatic alternatives for a multipolar world.
The agenda allowed members to exchange views on key BRICS pillars:
“i) Global and regional issues; ii) 20 years of BRICS, cooperation in resilience, innovation and sustainability; and iii) reforms of global governance and the multilateral system.”
China was absent from the meeting for scheduling reasons. The participating member states issued a joint statement on the themes under discussion. Despite hours of consensus-building, however, the summit did not produce a final communique signed unanimously by all members.
A diplomatic deadlock was observed between new members Iran and the UAE over wording on the Middle East conflict.
The primary document from New Delhi, the Chair’s Statement, suggests that BRICS has evolved from a diplomatic talk shop into an active project to engineer an independent global architecture. The collective language used by attending members suggests a coordinated and defensive response to current conditions.
“4. The Ministers noted the current global context of polarisation and distrust and encourage global action to strengthen international peace and security.
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Ensuring resilient global supply chains are important to fostering sustainable development and resilience for emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs).
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11. The Ministers agreed that, in the context of contemporary realities of the multipolar world, it is crucial that developing countries strengthen their efforts to promote dialogue and consultations for more just and equitable global governance and mutually beneficial relations among nations. They acknowledged that multipolarity can expand opportunities for EMDCs to develop their constructive potential and enjoy universally beneficial, inclusive and equitable economic globalisation and cooperation.”
The terms “polarisation and distrust” in a consensus-driven diplomatic text reflect the perspective of emerging powers on the breakdown of the post-Cold War order. They also censure G7-centred decision-making and unilateral mandates associated with Western influence.
The call for “global action to strengthen international peace and security” indicates an approach distinct from Western counterparts, which have historically relied on bloc-level revisionism and liberal institutionalism in multilateral bodies.
Linking supply-chain resilience directly to sustainable development suggests that BRICS members view logistics as central to the progress of EMDCs.
By urging developing nations to promote dialogue and consultation for more equitable global governance, the statement suggests a growing need for a parallel diplomatic track in a multipolar world.
“17. The Ministers underscored the importance of efforts to facilitate fast, low-cost, more accessible, efficient, transparent and safe cross-border payments among BRICS countries and other nations, which can support greater trade and investment flows.
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19. The Ministers condemned the imposition of unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law, and reiterated that such measures, inter alia in the form of unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions, have far-reaching negative implications for the human rights, including the rights to development, health and food security, of the general population of targeted states, disproportionately affecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations, widening the digital divide and exacerbating environmental challenges.”
The text lays out a moral and operational mandate for a parallel financial system. It responds to the perceived weaponization of SWIFT and dollar-denominated clearing mechanisms, envisioning payment infrastructure less dependent on the interests of major powers.
This vision is reflected in national payment systems such as RuPay in India, UnionPay in China, Mir in Russia, PASA in South Africa and Pix in Brazil. Decentralizing Western-centric systems could support a financial architecture operating independently of G7 interests.
The proposal is not presented as a tool for evading sanctions or undermining international law. Instead, it is framed as a transparent and efficient financial mechanism to support trade and as a modern alternative to Western payment systems.
Local-currency settlement and alternative cross-border payments could accelerate commercial transactions while reducing additional compliance costs.
The condemnation of unilateral sanctions reflects a view among Global South members that such measures carry significant legal and humanitarian costs.
The statement challenges US- and EU-origin sanctions, including secondary sanctions imposed on India over continued trade in oil and refined products. It links unilateral measures to the erosion of the fundamental rights of ordinary people. This framing presents sanctions as active contributors to humanitarian harm among vulnerable populations, while widening the digital divide and exacerbating environmental challenges.
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The Ministers expressed deep concern on the recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
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38. The Ministers emphasised that all affordable, reliable and sustainable energy sources and technologies, including low-emission and renewable options, play an important role in achieving the SDGs and energy security.”
The US–China summit operated as a centralized security board, issuing a top-down directive: “Both leaders agreed Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.” This relies on external imposition, defining the strategic limits of a sovereign state beyond its borders.
By contrast, the BRICS statement approaches regional volatility through diplomatic consensus and non-interference, expressing “deep concern” rather than issuing commands to targeted states. It does not prescribe what a state may or may not possess, instead focusing on de-escalation through dialogue and consultation.
The collective rejection of Western energy-transition policies as a cost burden on developing economies, through the linkage of energy security and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), frames energy choice as a matter for each state.
This could allow members such as India and China to continue importing Russian oil or Iranian gas while resisting Western institutional pressure and secondary sanctions.
“The proliferation of trade-restrictive actions, whether in the form of indiscriminate rising of tariffs and non-tariff measures, or protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives, threatens to further reduce global trade, disrupt global supply chains and introduce uncertainty into international economic and trade activities, potentially exacerbating existing economic disparities and affecting prospects for global economic development.”
This clause addresses economic measures used by some Western actors, including threatened secondary tariffs and sanctions. These are no longer only targeted measures; they can become structural tools for consolidating political alignment in trade and technology among BRICS members.
Threatening to cut off countries that maintain normal trade relations with a designated Western adversary turns such mechanisms into tools for enforcing political alignment with Western interests.
In the current geopolitical climate, indiscriminate tariff increases and non-tariff measures can insulate domestic markets while challenging principles of non-discrimination and fair competition upheld by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The reference to “protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives” targets policies such as green compliance penalties and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which charges for imported goods based on production emissions. BRICS presents such measures as possible trade barriers that protect domestic industries while penalizing EMDCs that lack the capital to meet externally set climate requirements.
“60. The Ministers noted that the BRICS expansion reflects its influence, credibility and appeal as an important platform for inclusive global governance.”
BRICS members increasingly articulate a vision of greater institutional autonomy and mechanisms that could diversify dependencies on Western-dominated structures.
Emphasis on “inclusive global governance” positions the platform as a place where sovereign states can trade, clear payments and manage regional development with greater independence from Western mandates.
Two Tracks, One System
The Beijing bilateral statement and the BRICS+ joint statement should not be viewed as isolated diplomatic events. The two tracks appear complementary, addressing similar structural challenges through different mechanisms.
Beijing’s transactional agreements with the US reflect a pragmatic acknowledgement of economic entanglement: no state, regardless of manufacturing capacity or ubiquity, can decouple instantly without shocks to domestic industry.
At the same time, the New Delhi track functions as a structural engine for long-term de-linking. Its strategic narratives emphasize autonomy through diversification and national prioritization. The BRICS+ architecture builds institutional foundations for an alternative global architecture to the post-1945 order, rather than simply replacing it.
The tracks are complementary. Tactical stability secured through bilateral transactionalism can temporarily reduce tensions and provide space to build parallel infrastructure without triggering skepticism or a premature systemic collapse.
Implications for Poland
The dual-track realities in Beijing and New Delhi create pressure for middle powers such as Poland, which faces a structural paradox.
Warsaw’s alignment with Western institutions remains firm and non-negotiable on key matters of defence, critical infrastructure and people-to-people movement west of its borders. Yet Poland’s long-term macroeconomic expansion, industrial export potential and logistics position are increasingly connected to key members of the BRICS+ bloc.
The table shows Poland’s import value, export value and trade balance with BRICS+ members in 2024, based on the 2025 Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics of Poland. A country-by-country breakdown is provided in Appendix A.
Imports from BRICS+ members account for approximately 19.98% of Poland’s total import value, while exports to the group account for 3.18% of all Polish exports in 2024. As Poland seeks to expand its economic prospects and influence in the Global South, trade with the region may grow, including through closer partner ties under the BRICS+ umbrella.
An important feature of the data is continued trade between Poland and the Russian Federation despite the post-2022 sanctions environment. The figures suggest that Poland’s strategic decoupling remains partial rather than absolute.
China occupies a distinct position in this relationship. Trade is heavily concentrated in manufactured and technological goods. The trade imbalance of .86 billion demonstrates Poland’s greater trade dependence on China than on any other BRICS+ member.
Trade with Saudi Arabia remains concentrated in energy-related imports, particularly hydrocarbons. This may decline as Poland pursues renewable alternatives.
The data indicate that Poland’s security and economic architectures increasingly operate on parallel tracks. Warsaw remains firmly anchored in NATO and the EU for defence and political alignment, while its commercial relations are increasingly connected to BRICS+ economies. Although this article treats BRICS+ as a collective, Poland’s trade with the group is shaped primarily by China, with Saudi Arabia and India also significant in terms of economic exposure.
Poland should therefore take a flexible approach: reinforce its Western defence commitments while using a pragmatic, non-impositional diplomatic posture to protect its economic interests with the global majority.
Appendix A
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