Publication · October 11, 2025

How the 2025 SCO Summit Redefines Eurasian Cooperation

By Adithya Suresh · 14 min read

A regional analysis examining the evolving geopolitical structure of Eurasia and the multilateral strategies that have emerged and will emerge from the SCO framework.

The most recent summit has raised more eyeballs than usual, while the nature of summit is mostly economic. The common meeting among the leaders among India, China, and Russia has brought a certain buzz among western officials. This was primarily due to the remarks of American President Donald Trump’s on Indian leadership who were recently slapped with a tariff of 50% .The decision had caused the Indian administration to rethink its options when considering its trading partners as the country enjoys huge IT related exports to the western power. The imposition of tariffs has put India in a counterbalance in its relation with the US.

The US had earlier accused the South Asian country of funding the Russia Ukraine War through its reselling of crude oil by refining it and selling the resource to the EU and the US itself. This argument had been subsequently dissected by the Indian Ambassador to the UK who had earlier called the western power for its “hypocrisy” as it had accused both EU and the US for its import of Russian uranium hexafluoride for use in its nuclear power industry, palladium, fertilisers and chemicals.

On the other hand, one of the former US ambassadors to India also agree on the matter that India has been unfairly facing tariffs for solely for its import and refinement of Russian Oil. This argument also falls in line which some observers have talked about in regards to the recent development in India-US relations.

China’s Massive Import of Russian Energy Sources

The imposition of tariffs on the south asian power was much lower in comparison to China who has been a major contributor which had been imposed a tariff rate of 35% could partly be due to their dependence on China as a manufacturing hub. In addition to the tariff, China is by far the largest importer of Russian oil worth 11.76 billion USD in oil imports, 2.36 billion USD in pipe gas imports, 1.75 billion USD in coal imports and about 889 million USD in LNG imports as per the data presented in Q2 2025. The graph presented below gives a better picture of the trends presented for all of the mentioned resources.

Pipe gas for one had witnessed a steady growth across all years and rose at a sharper rate especially after the beginning of the ongoing Russian Ukraine conflict in 2022. Furthermore, while China has attempted in decreasing its supply from the federation across all resources, Russia still remains a key supplier for the Eastern power, despite oil imports seeing a steady decline since Q1 2024. It still remains at similar levels to Q1 2022, around the beginning of the kinetic conflict.

While investments from China in the Russian federation have decreased from 1.2 billion $ annually between 2011–2018 to 400 million $ in 2022–23, China’s active investments in the country have decreased by two thirds. The investments are still quite substantial and hence do actively play a role in funding the ongoing war.

Apart from China’s import of Russian energy sources, in the same time span, India, despite being widely accused of funding the war in Ukraine, had imported 10 billion $ in June 2025, which was a decrease of 800 million $ when compared to the previous year of oil imports, which was around 10.8 billion $ in June 2024. This parity of 1.76 billion $ in comparison with that of China highlights the selective double standards showcased by both the EU and US.

Furthermore, the nature of the tariffs combined with the EU’s recent sanctions on India’s oil refinery Nayara—through asset freezes, trade restrictions and financial restrictions—has had a significant impact on the refinery, which has operated and helped India get around earlier sanctions on Russian oil. The recent wave of sanctions forced the company to cut output to 70–80% in August 2025.

Double Standards in the West’s Imposition of Tariffs and Sanctions?

The move further blurs the line in what Western powers deem fair. They have been noticeably hesitant to impose sanctions on China, primarily because of their recent economic dependence on the country. US–China trade was valued at $643.2 billion in 2023, while US foreign direct investment in China stood at $28 billion. China also has substantial trade ties with the EU: the two are each other’s largest trading partners, with bilateral trade valued at €732 billion in 2024 and EU investment in China exceeding €42 billion, a 47% increase from the previous year.

By comparison, India–US trade reached about $212.3 billion in 2024, while India–EU trade was about $137.41 billion. US foreign direct investment from India was valued at $4.66 billion, and Indian investment in the EU was worth €10.2 billion that year.

The economic data on trade and investment suggest that sanctioning and publicly opposing China would cost Western powers more than taking similar measures against India. European and American companies also use China as a major manufacturing hub. Sanctioning India over its potential contribution to Russia’s war effort, while applying a different standard to China, could cause a ripple effect across the Global South. It could deepen mistrust between Western powers and Global South countries, including on issues that require broad international cooperation.

Loopholes in the Imposition of Sanctions

While the EU and US sanction countries over their support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, products from Western companies such as Apple, Nike and Adidas continue to reach the Russian market through the country’s parallel import programme. Products are reportedly exported from Kazakhstan into Russia. The availability of Apple’s iPhone 17 series in Russia after its release in September is one example. The sale of Western products may not fund Russia’s war effort directly, but it can contribute indirectly through the substantial tax revenue these companies generate. Russian media outlets have also reported that fast-food chains such as McDonald’s, Starbucks, KFC and Pizza Hut continue to operate in Russia under different names, sometimes with altered menus.

The continued availability of many Western brands in Russia well after sanctions were imposed highlights the difficulty of enforcing them. The role of Chinese automobile companies such as Chery, Haval and Geely also raises questions about who is sustaining Russia’s economy. Chinese companies have filled gaps left by the exit of some Western manufacturers, including Mercedes-Benz, BMW and Audi. Indian companies have not played as large a role in Russia’s economic activity, particularly since the start of the Russia–Ukraine war.

Potential Consequences of Economic Coercion on India

Tariffs and sanctions on India may also concern countries such as the Philippines, which has increasingly relied on India as part of its efforts to counter China, including through the Quad partnership among India, the US, Australia and Japan. Although the Philippine coast guard and navy have cooperated with Quad partners, their capabilities remain far smaller than China’s.

A key objective of this defence cooperation is to counter Chinese influence in the South China Sea. China has constructed hundreds of artificial islands to extend its influence over the region, a campaign often described as the “Great Wall of Sand.”

The figure represents the locations of artificial islands constructed by China in recent years. Many lie in the South China Sea, close to island nations such as Malaysia and the Philippines, and within reach of Indonesia. Their presence has remained a key point of contention, especially for the Philippines, because it directly challenges its sovereignty.

Island nations have consequently had to rethink how to respond to China’s growing military influence. India’s realignment with the US and its symbolic move to reopen talks with China could affect those calculations. Such a shift may counterbalance the effects of US tariffs and sanctions, while also changing how regional partners assess their security options. The Quad could lose effectiveness if India’s position on the Chinese threat in the South China Sea changes. Island nations might move closer to the US, or the uncertainty could contribute to rapid militarisation across the region.

India’s engagement with China at the SCO summit was presented as a “reset” in relations. The two countries held detailed talks for the first time since the 2020 Galwan border clash, which marked a serious deterioration in bilateral ties. From a realist perspective, Washington’s tariffs and public statements against India may have acted as a catalyst for renewed talks between India and China. Some observers, however, have argued that the US leader’s pragmatism in these exchanges is driven by personal ambitions for global recognition. This episode illustrates how a leader’s personal ambitions can undermine, or even set back, years of diplomatic cooperation.

India’s position also reflects a foreign policy that is not aligned with any single major power. Its attempt to realign may therefore be understood as a way to reduce its overall dependence on Washington.

Different Perspectives on the Summit

From a constructivist perspective, the renewed engagement between India and China may also draw on a shared cultural history stretching back more than 2,000 years. Political differences since 1947 have driven the countries apart, but shared cultural identities and historical connections may have contributed to the recent diplomatic reset.

From a global justice perspective, the US and European countries occupy a privileged position in the international economy. According to the Indian administration, the availability of cheaper oil from countries such as Iran and Venezuela—both subject to US sanctions—has pushed India to buy more Russian oil, which is offered at a lower price and with substantial discounts. Those savings matter to a developing country such as India. In a developed economy, consumers may be better able to absorb the higher costs of alternative supplies.

A Neocolonial Perspective

From a neocolonial perspective, economic pressure by the US and EU on India—and, to a certain extent, China—can be seen as an attempt to gain political influence through economic means, including primary and secondary sanctions and the widespread imposition of high tariffs. Some observers argue that the US tariffs on India are intended to bring the country’s foreign policy into closer alignment with Washington’s.

A Change in Defence Commitments?

From a military perspective, India’s apparent shift in alignment towards China following the summit has coincided with changes in its defence posture. The Indian military has officially shown disinterest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets, citing concerns about strategic autonomy and restrictions on modifying the aircraft to accommodate the country’s BrahMos missiles. The deal was viewed as important to India’s air force, given China’s own fifth-generation fighter jets and reports that Pakistan could receive Chinese fifth-generation aircraft by the end of 2025.

Some observers argue that India had already decided to shift its defence alignment away from the US because the Western power had failed to meet its commitment to deliver General Electric engines for the Tejas line of Indian Air Force jets. Delays of more than two years reportedly prompted the air force to reconsider its priorities, including domestic engine development through the Kaveri programme and joint development with France’s Safran of an engine for India’s indigenous AMCA fighter.

Outcomes of the Summit

To counter both the US and China, Russia has offered India its Su-57 fifth-generation fighter with full access to the source code. Such access could allow India to integrate indigenous weapons, including the jointly developed BrahMos missile. The proposed deal is described as similar to the existing BrahMos arrangement, with a manufacturing plant to be established in India and rights to build the aircraft. This could help India acquire a fleet of fifth-generation jets while developing its own indigenous AMCA aircraft. The offer from the Eurasian power also symbolically reflects the friendship and trust between the two countries.

In contrast, relations between Russia and China have remained largely unchanged despite recent espionage allegations against China. The incident has had little apparent effect on ties between the two countries. The frequent imposition of tariffs has increased BRICS’ relevance in international forums, as more SCO members, along with North Korea, have reportedly applied for membership to counter US influence and what they view as realist actions on the global stage.

Following the summit, Washington also made plans to impose secondary sanctions on the EU over its trade and economic relations with India. The EU has been reluctant to sanction the subcontinent, but its limited public opposition suggests the proposal may still find support among some members. This position has been linked to concerns over India’s continued purchase and refining of Russian oil and its resale to European and North American markets.

This contrasts with the West’s earlier appeals to India to buy Russian oil during the initial stages of the Russia–Ukraine war, when Western governments argued that a complete halt in Russian supplies could cause a collapse in the global oil market. Yet through August 2025, India’s share of oil imports remained below China’s, which continued to be the largest buyer of Russian oil and other energy sources. China’s lower level of economic sanctions may reflect the depth of its manufacturing ties with Western economies.

From a diplomatic perspective, widespread tariffs and possible secondary tariffs could deepen the divide between the Global South and the Global North. Growing mistrust between the two sides could become a barrier to economic cooperation and to issues that require a common international consensus.

The Future of the SCO’s Relevance in Global Standing

In conclusion, the latest SCO summit matters to global politics because of the events leading up to it and the geopolitical implications for regional actors. In previous years, the summit had little influence on global affairs, but the context surrounding this meeting brought it to centre stage. The SCO has the potential to serve as a voice for Asian and Eurasian countries, many of which have limited influence in global politics. Its future relevance could shape regional geopolitics. The summit may eventually be viewed as the start of a new chapter in global politics, as new alignments and old rivalries reshape the foundations of geopolitics.

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