Publication · July 21, 2026

Beyond the White Eagle: A Strategic Recalibration in Polish–Ukrainian Relations

By Adithya Suresh · 14 min read

How diplomacy, trade and migration reveal the strategic recalibration of Polish–Ukrainian relations.

On 19 June 2026, the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest and most prestigious state decoration, awarded for outstanding service to the Republic of Poland, was officially revoked from Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine. Polish President Karol Nawrocki announced: “I have decided to revoke the Order of the White Eagle from the President of Ukraine” [1].

Zelenskyy had received the award on 5 April 2023, reflecting deepened cooperation and solidarity with Ukraine. The revocation followed a critical turning point in relations. Almost a month earlier, on 26 May 2026, Ukraine’s president had awarded the Ukrainian Special Operations Centre North the honorary title “Heroes of the UPA,” saying the move was intended to “restore the historical traditions of the national army” [2].

The decision to honour the unit drew criticism from the Polish public because the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was responsible for the massacre of approximately 100,000 Polish civilians during World War II in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as part of an ethnic-cleansing campaign. The move came amid ongoing negotiations between the two countries over exhuming victims of the massacres.

Kyiv views the UPA’s legacy as a national historical symbol of armed resistance against Bolshevik-Communist occupation and imperial aggression from its eastern neighbour. The rationale presented by Ukraine is functional: the decision was intended to boost morale by invoking historical figures.

For Warsaw, the UPA represents the trauma of an ethnically targeted mass killing. The decision was viewed as a hardline stance against Polish interests, given the scale of the atrocities and their symbolism. This became a moral impetus for revoking the White Eagle previously awarded to Zelenskyy on 5 April 2023 for deepened cooperation and Polish solidarity in advancing shared interests [3].

This article examines whether the revocation was an isolated diplomatic incident or the culmination of wider structural changes in diplomatic, economic and strategic relations between Poland and Ukraine.

The incident cannot be understood solely through the symbolic act of revoking the Order of the White Eagle. It is better understood by comparing diplomatic language at the time of the 2023 award with the rhetoric surrounding its 2026 revocation.

The transition reveals a shift in how the two states framed one another as partners. In the post-invasion period, language moved from solidarity-based diplomacy toward boundary-setting, shaped by historical trauma, wartime identity and domestic pressures.

In April 2023, the language used by both presidents reflected a significant change in Polish–Ukrainian relations. Zelenskyy described “the relations between Ukraine and Poland [as demonstrating] historical strength.” President Duda echoed the sentiment, emphasizing Zelenskyy’s solidarity with his people “in the face of aggression” and framing the award as a symbol of shared struggle. The rhetoric was civilizational and constructive, grounded in unity against a common adversary: the Russian Federation.

By June 2026, the tone had shifted. Nawrocki’s revocation statement was emotionally and morally charged. Unlike earlier alliance rhetoric, the president invoked the “100,000 Polish citizens [who] were murdered,” emphasizing that women, children and the elderly were among the victims. This framed Ukraine’s decision to honour the UPA as a matter of moral justice.

Through the president’s language, Warsaw viewed Kyiv’s actions as immoral conduct with implications for cooperation across multiple fields. The response established a historical red line: the lives lost in the massacres were non-negotiable. The call to “return to the path of trust and mutual respect” amounted to a formal diplomatic reprimand, signalling that Ukraine’s wartime decisions had crossed a line Poland considered morally incomprehensible.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, by contrast, framed Russian war crimes through a moral-justice lens emphasizing international law and accountability [4]. The contrast shows how the two countries apply similar rhetorical patterns in different historical and political contexts.

Diplomatic rhetoric is the visible surface of Polish–Ukrainian tensions. Deeper structural factors in defence cooperation, trade and cross-border migration may also shape the relationship in the post-war environment.

It is therefore useful to examine movement across the Polish–Ukrainian border, the economic responsibilities borne by Polish municipalities, friction in agriculture and labour markets, and cross-border trade. Diplomatic rhetoric shows how governments communicate; migration flows provide a complementary indicator of the relationship in practice.

The table presents migration-flow data for the first quarter of each year since the start of the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

After 2022, the number of people entering Poland from Ukraine declined by around 4% in successive years following the initial influx. Although 2025 was an anomaly, with a modest increase of 0.3%, the broader trend suggests continued decline in entries into Poland.

Over the same period, refusals of entry from the Ukrainian side increased, despite the decline in arrivals. Neither the falling inflow nor the increase in refusals can reasonably be attributed to the revocation of the state award. Possible explanations include stabilization in parts of Ukraine and calibrated changes to Polish domestic systems intended to reduce economic pressure on GDP.

Conversely, legal changes such as the European Commission’s extension of temporary protection for Ukrainian nationals until 4 March 2028 demonstrate the EU’s continued commitment to support Ukraine [10]. This decision could influence migration dynamics into and within Poland in the near future.

Poland’s trade relationship with Ukraine from 2022 to 2024 illustrates a structural shift shaped by wartime dynamics and changing demand across sectors.

The period saw Poland’s trade surplus more than double, from $3.81 billion in 2022 to $9.06 billion in 2024. This reflects Ukraine’s increased reliance on Polish industrial and consumer goods, partly because of damage to its industries during the war with Russia. Imports of Ukrainian goods into Poland, particularly agricultural products, fell by 41.25%, a change linked to EU restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural products.

A harder line was also taken in the “Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Agriculture of the Frontline Member States on the agricultural aspects of the modification of the EU-Ukraine trade agreement,” issued on 9 July 2025.

“(1) REMIND that in recent years the high volume of Ukrainian agricultural import has significantly disrupted markets in our countries, as the vast majority of goods imported from Ukraine to the EU ended up in the frontline Member States, creating an uneven playing field for our farmers.

(2) UNDERLINE that the full liberalization of import from Ukraine has resulted in an imbalance that threatens the stability of our agricultural sectors. The adverse consequences of these imports are evident, as they undermine the competitiveness of local producers, lead to market distortions, the loss of our traditional export destinations and place excessive pressure on our rural economies.” [15]

The joint declaration expresses concerns not only about the interests of Polish farmers, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, but also about a broader structural shift in Central Europe. Governments in the region increasingly view high volumes of underpriced Ukrainian grain as a threat to domestic markets and local livelihoods.

Meanwhile, Polish exports of machinery, transport equipment and consumer goods rose sharply. Machinery and transport exports more than doubled, from $1.75 billion to $3.95 billion, underscoring Poland’s emerging role as a supplier of consumer goods, industrial equipment and materials for reconstruction.

Industrial production, particularly chemicals, stands out as an anomaly in the dataset. Imports fell from $215 million to $3.5 million, while exports fluctuated sharply—from $30 million to $1.61 billion in 2023, then down to $7 million in 2024. The volatility may reflect one-off or irregular shipments linked to urgent wartime demand for fertilizers and industrial reagents.

Overall, wartime substitution shapes Poland’s economic relationship with Ukraine across many sectors: Ukraine imports goods that it can no longer reliably produce, while Polish industry helps fill the gap quickly.

The dataset ends in 2024 because GUS publishes full-year trade statistics later; complete 2025 data are not yet available.

The Steel Gap

Refined steel, unlike ordinary factory steel, is essential for infrastructure projects and meeting immediate military needs. Due to the ongoing conflict, Ukraine’s refined-steel capacity—vital for reconstruction and infrastructure projects—has been depleted. Before 2022, Ukraine had crude steelmaking capacity of 42.5 million metric tonnes.

Following the destruction of key steelworks, the OECD revised its estimate of Ukraine’s annual steelmaking capacity to 8 million metric tonnes [16]. The remaining mills are operating at close to 92.5% of capacity [17], leaving little room for substantial growth to meet domestic demand of 12.9 million tonnes [18].

Demand is driven by major infrastructure projects, including railway and roadway expansions and energy projects linked to broader EU targets and commitments.

Poland imports 93.6% of its iron ore from Ukraine [19] for steel production and immediate domestic needs. This exposure has increased as Poland shifted purchases away from Russian iron ore. Meanwhile, Ukrainian production has largely shifted from consumer goods toward heavy infrastructure [20]. Refined steel remains a key gap for both countries.

For Poland, this gap presents an economic opportunity. Ukraine’s reconstruction will require bridges, railways, power plants, industrial zones, ports, pipelines, logistics hubs and many other projects that use refined steel.

Warsaw could pursue the ambition of becoming a reconstruction hub for Ukraine. This could reduce dependence on external supplies of the material while increasing the existing trade surplus with Ukraine.

One initial step could be a joint statement with Ukraine recognizing the genocide as a historical event that affected lives on both sides, while responding to Poland’s request for large-scale exhumations and preserving the sensitivities of both societies.

Historical reconciliation and industrial cooperation are distinct areas of diplomacy. In Polish–Ukrainian relations, however, economic interdependence and each country’s reliance on the other to achieve stated goals make it important to acknowledge their shared past. This begins with recognizing the genocide as a real event that killed a significant number of Poles, while not requiring Ukraine to disavow the UPA’s place in its national identity and struggle for sovereignty. Politicization and heightened sensitivities could risk economic relations amid domestic political pressures on both sides.

Cooperation would also require responding to Poland’s request to exhume victims and give them a proper burial in Polish soil, their homeland.

This shift could be formalized through a bilateral memorandum of understanding and, later, a strategic industrial framework positioning Poland as a long-term supplier of refined steel for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

The steel gap can be addressed by consolidating mutual strategic interests. For Poland, this would help close a major gap in external dependence on steel; for Ukraine, it would provide a supplier for immediate needs and reconstruction.

Calibrated adjustments across these areas could lead to a new paradigm in relations through what I term Western Transnationalism.

This model may be economically sustainable for Poland in the near future. Current Polish financial aid to Ukraine amounts to 4.91% of GDP, particularly in military assistance and humanitarian support [21]. This combines with additional pressures linked to demographic change and migration from Ukraine [22], as discussed in the Annual Progress Report on implementation of the Medium-Term Fiscal Structural Plan for 2025–2028.

Taken together, structural pressures in agriculture and the changing trade balance suggest that Polish–Ukrainian relations, following the return of the Order of the White Eagle, are not entering a period of downgrading but of restructuring.

The emergence of refined steel as a strategic gap for both countries could mark a new shift in bilateral and industrial cooperation. Rather than allowing diplomatic friction to hold back talks or determine economic policy, Warsaw could build long-term industrial capacity and position Poland as a primary supplier of refined steel for the region and further east.

This would move the relationship from short-term sensitivities toward mutually beneficial economic interdependence.

The recalibration documented throughout this article should not be read as strategic disengagement. It suggests that bilateral cooperation is entering a new phase in which historical memory, domestic political constraints and economic interdependence increasingly coexist. The future of Polish–Ukrainian relations may depend less on symbolism than on whether both states can secure benefits in strategically important areas.

Sources Consulted

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