Publication · October 4, 2026

Beyond BRICS: The New Delhi Declaration

By Adithya Suresh · 16 min read

Beyond BRICS examines the New Delhi Declaration and what its emerging economic, security, payment and space architectures mean for Poland.

On 12–13 September, the leaders of the BRICS countries convened for the 2026 BRICS Leaders’ Summit under India’s chairmanship. They discussed a range of issues, including the geopolitical climate and emerging concerns among leaders and their delegations. The New Delhi Declaration, produced through their discussions, offers a view of the organization’s priorities and how its members intend to advance cooperation across sectors of global governance.

Rather than a merely symbolic statement of Global South solidarity, the declaration can be read as an operational blueprint intended to insulate member states from external institutional leverage. The areas it addresses signal potential shifts in priorities and emerging concerns among the organization and its members.

“We reaffirm our unwavering support for reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to strengthening a non-discriminatory, open, equitable, transparent, fair, inclusive, predictable, and rules-based multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core, while upholding the foundational principles, such as Most-Favoured Nation Treatment and Special and Differential Treatment for developing members, particularly LDCs.”

This statement advocates for the WTO’s foundational principles of making global commerce fair, predictable and open.

The declaration’s condemnation of unilateral coercive measures reflects BRICS members’ view that such measures run counter to international law and the philosophy of globalization. Recent secondary sanctions on BRICS members for trade in specific sectors are cited as examples: Brazil over imports of Russian fertilizers [1], China over imports of Russian oil and gas [2], and India over imports of Russian oil products [3].

This interpretation holds that, beyond their human-rights implications, such measures can affect citizens’ livelihoods. Even marginal price increases in everyday goods can substantially affect quality of life.

This creates a shared Global South position against external economic coercion, framing unilateral tariffs, secondary sanctions and trade protectionism not simply as pressure to achieve policy or political goals, but as violations of international law and the principles of the UN Charter.

Actions by select Global North states can also influence the prices of commodities and essential goods for middle-class populations within their own borders. Oil, grain and other necessities are affected by these price dynamics. At the time of writing, Poland faces record fuel prices [4], while supply chains are also affected.

“[The Declaration] expresses further concern over the current state of polarization and fragmentation in the international order. [It] expresses alarm at the current trend that has seen a critical increase in global military spending.”

These concerns are valid in light of increased defence spending by Western-aligned states, including in East Asia. At the same time, some BRICS+ members are viewed as contributing to rapid militarization and escalating polarization in sensitive regions, where even limited defensive arrangements can trigger alarm amid heightened tensions.

In the current global climate, the absence of confidence-building measures on both sides could weaken international peace, security and trust. It could also complicate cooperation on shared challenges, including scam compounds and cross-border terrorism that affect ordinary citizens in different countries.

A Rising Transnational Threat

“We underline the importance of coordinated international actions to dismantle these illegal networks, trace and recover criminal proceeds, protect victims and prevent the misuse of financial institutions and emerging payment methods for large-scale fund transfers.”

Scam compounds are a shared concern because the same methods operate across several BRICS members and in parts of the Global North. The issue remains underexposed in global forums. The United Nations has described it as a “global humanitarian crisis,” while efforts to trace finances and recover assets remain difficult.

Common operational frameworks, including anti-money-laundering (AML) work through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), have helped address the problem to some extent. However, ambiguity around crypto-based payment networks and gaps in cross-border regulation may require more cooperation through information-sharing and cross-border investigation frameworks.

The Hanoi Convention against Cybercrime, formally adopted in 2025, has not yet received broad adoption and ratification among BRICS members. It harmonizes the treatment of information and communications technology-related theft and fraud as criminal offences and provides for mutual legal assistance and international cooperation. These mechanisms could help combat such crimes.

At the time of writing, Azerbaijan, Qatar and Vietnam were the only signatories cited as having ratified the convention [5], well below the minimum needed for it to become fully binding under international law. In Myanmar, scam compounds [6] operate as industrial-scale complexes, often near the borders of Thailand and China, including in the Golden Triangle [7], a region associated with similar criminal operations.

Cambodia has collaborated with international partners, including the US Scam Center Strike Force and the UK National Crime Agency, on parallel investigations, information-sharing about Chinese transnational criminal networks and joint prioritization of cases [8].

In Laos, similar operations are reported in Special Economic Zones such as the Golden Triangle SEZ [9]. The zone’s status can make it difficult for police to intervene in raids or shut down operations. Domestic legislative changes targeting cybercrime could demonstrate further commitment and cooperation.

Myanmar, amid its ongoing civil war, contains many such compounds. Their decentralized operational hierarchy further complicates the government’s ability to develop or implement an effective response.

Targeted sanctions against the leaders of these operations by EU authorities in February 2026 [10] have not halted their continued growth.

These enforcement frameworks often rely on traditional financial controls, targeting intermediaries such as banks and centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, where compliance checks and account freezes can follow legal notices.

Decentralized cryptocurrency networks and wallets are harder to restrict. A wallet address or network generally cannot be blocked in the same way, even when a government serves legal notice or considers the activity a national-security threat.

Funds can pass through multiple wallets within seconds, depending on the network, often for minimal transaction fees. Popular networks such as Solana can cost a fraction of a cent per transaction, regardless of the transfer’s value [11].

Multiple transactions may be carried out rapidly before funds reach their final destination. No comprehensive global or regional framework currently governs this activity outside of cryptocurrency exchanges.

Revenue from scam compounds may also support wider criminal operations, including drug trafficking and terrorist activity. These networks use physical cash and cryptocurrency for payments and transfers, compounding the risks to public safety and regional stability.

Newer frameworks, such as the Guwahati Declaration, which aims to improve “the exchange of information, intelligence and best practices, consistent with national laws and international obligations,” could be combined with cooperation through the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) to address overlapping threats.

The links between these issues are reflected in the activity of transnational terrorist networks. For example, Pakistan-backed militant groups have been linked to instability in Jammu and Kashmir and drug trafficking in Punjab, allegedly involving Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) [12].

Another example is Daesh’s terrorist financing network. As one assessment observes, “new financial tools such as virtual currencies create new challenges in terms of combatting terrorist financing. Highly versatile criminals are quick to switch to new channels if existing ones become too risky” [13].

A Case for the BRICS Payment Network

“In this regard, we acknowledge the work done to study the cross-border interoperability of payment and messaging channels, and the discussions on promoting trade settlements and investments using BRICS local currencies, while respecting national priorities and acknowledging that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. We encourage the BPTF to continue discussions, building on the ongoing work, to facilitate practical solutions for cross-border payments among BRICS countries, which are fast, low-cost, more accessible, efficient, transparent and safe.”

The focus on payment systems reflects a shared concern about dependence on the US dollar as the default currency for trade. Reliance on the SWIFT network for a large share of international trade and financial transactions raises concerns that overdependence could become a source of pressure, influencing decisions by BRICS members and other countries.

Developing a cross-border payment network could help sustain trade across different currencies. Some have argued for a common currency, a concept floated at the previous BRICS summit in Brazil in 2025.

Unlike conventional payment frameworks such as SWIFT, which have previously been restricted or suspended as geopolitical penalties, alternatives such as China’s CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) and Russia’s SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) may be more expensive or time-consuming for some users.

A common BRICS currency might address some problems associated with payment networks, but it would raise difficult questions about how its value would be set and how it would coexist with member states’ national currencies. It could also be used to circumvent sanctions on some members.

Those sanctions create a risk that a shared currency could be used to justify secondary sanctions on other members that were not involved in the conduct cited to justify the original measures. Although the euro provides a successful example of a supranational currency in the European Union, creating a common BRICS currency under the current geopolitical conditions could pose even more complex challenges than building a payment network.

The proposed decentralized payment network takes a different approach: linking the domestic payment systems of BRICS members through a shared protocol. This could support de-dollarization and greater payment sovereignty by enabling trade directly in national currencies, reducing exchange costs and facilitating trade. The organization does not present it as a replacement for SWIFT, but as a viable alternative.

Sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 illustrate how SWIFT and similar payment networks can be used as instruments of geopolitical pressure to encourage compliance with the values of the states that control them.

There is no guarantee that similar measures could not be used against EU members, including Poland, under the technical rules and terms of service governing these systems.

The EU also faces significant challenges and could benefit from an indigenous payment network that reduces dependence on non-EU solutions.

Ongoing initiatives such as the European Payments Initiative (EPI) and the digital euro reflect the EU’s aim to reduce vulnerability to foreign-controlled financial systems. EPI seeks to bring national payment networks under a common European framework. Greater independence from external payment networks, alongside European Central Bank oversight, could strengthen data protection for consumer spending information.

The BRICS payment network is a replicable framework for pursuing payment sovereignty and financial infrastructure independence, with payment systems less exposed to the geopolitical interests of individual parties.

Space Governance and an Emerging Architecture

“We welcome the discussions in the BRICS heads of space agencies meeting held in Bengaluru that emphasised the importance of space debris mitigation for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. We also appreciate the significant progress in finalising the amendment to the BRICS RSSC agreement for making provision for inclusion of new BRICS space agencies and in drafting the Terms of Reference of the BRICS Space Council.” [15]

The European Space Agency (ESA), Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and African Space Agency (AfSA) are multilateral space agencies. Some BRICS members participate in these frameworks, including China and Iran in APSCO [16], and South Africa and Ethiopia in AfSA [17].

The proposed BRICS framework could establish a significant cross-continental space cooperation body not anchored to regional proximity. Unlike agencies that pool funds for shared goals or joint missions to build and launch rockets, the space council is distinctive in its potential to connect and coordinate national space programmes.

The council’s non-securitised stance is notable in the current era of renewed competition in space. Some agencies are investing in space capabilities with limited attention to the risks of extending defence competition into orbit.

Investment in the weaponization of space could complicate relations during conflicts between major powers whose space agencies operate in orbit. Technologies deployed for military purposes could also create spillover effects for countries operating peacefully.

The summit text points to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which remains a foundation of international space law. Article IV prohibits placing objects carrying nuclear weapons in orbit or stationing such weapons in outer space, as well as placing weapons on celestial bodies [18]. The treaty may require updating to address more modern forms of attack, including cyber operations and signal jamming that could disrupt an adversary’s satellites.

Poland and the Emergent BRICS Architecture

The issues discussed on the BRICS summit agenda overlap with challenges facing the Polish state.

In the space sector, although participation is expensive and Poland is not part of the BRICS space-unification framework, the country’s space agency, POLSA, merits attention. Poland uses a contribution-based model and pursues bilateral development programmes with ESA. This may be cost-effective in the short term, but it risks creating a dependency in which Poland continues to rely on ESA for infrastructure and technological development.

Poland could also sustain investments in projects that strengthen its own space programme, advance technology and preserve long-term sovereignty, such as developing components and deploying domestically developed sensors.

Alongside its existing ESA commitments, these investments could help Poland preserve autonomy, reduce dependence on external actors and become a net contributor to Europe’s space architecture.

In payments, Warsaw has domestic capabilities through BLIK, an indigenous payment system. However, Poland remains exposed to non-EU payment networks. BLIK is often preferred for e-commerce payments [19], but it faces adoption challenges at point-of-sale (POS) terminals, where external non-EU networks remain dominant, partly for convenience. The number of transactions has grown rapidly, according to data reported by Narodowy Bank Polski in December 2025 [20].

Poland also faces a nuanced choice around integration with EPI and the digital euro, given that these initiatives currently rely on euro payments [21] while Poland’s national currency is the złoty.

The current pilot programme lacks the exchange capabilities needed to integrate a member state’s national currency outside the eurozone, even though that state is part of the EU [22].

Although state-owned PKO Bank Polski is a founding shareholder, system-to-system interoperability and wider EPI integration could affect how the złoty exchanges against the euro if transactions require conversion into euros.

A Poland-focused project under the EPI umbrella, using the same technological framework while enabling payments in the national currency, could support payment sovereignty, strengthen the wider network and limit dependence on non-native payment solutions.

With prices fluctuating amid conflicts in the Middle East and neighbouring regions, Poland remains exposed to volatile commodity and food prices that affect everyday goods and services. These dynamics influence inflation. GUS data reported by PAP recently put inflation at 4.1% in September, a month-on-month rise of 0.7 percentage points [23].

Taken together, these concerns show that Poland, despite its institutional alignment with the EU and the Global North, faces governance challenges similar to those identified by BRICS members—challenges increasingly affecting middle powers across both the Global North and Global South.

Sources Consulted

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2. Gao Zhan, G. (2026, September 20). “China opposes ‘secondary sanctions,’ urges US to maintain stable trade ties.” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved October 3, 2026. SCIO.
3. “Statement by official spokesperson.” (2025, August 4). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Retrieved October 3, 2026. MEA.
4. Beszłej, F. J. (2026, September 16). “Diesel hits record high in Poland as fuel support ends.” TVP World. Retrieved September 27, 2026. TVP World.
5. United Nations Treaty Collection. “Hanoi Convention against Cybercrime.” Retrieved September 29, 2026. UNTC.
6. Barber, H. (2026, August 20). “They escaped south-east Asia’s scam compounds. Then they realised they were still trapped.” The Guardian. The Guardian.
7. Moo, M. (2026, June 26). “Confronting human trafficking in the Golden Triangle.” The Salvation Army, All the World. Retrieved September 29, 2026. All the World.
8. “U.S. and UK Launch First-of-Its-Kind Joint Alliance to Dismantle Global Scam Centers.” (2026, September 3). Retrieved September 29, 2026. U.S. Department of Justice.
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11. Solana. “Sending and Receiving SOL.” Retrieved September 29, 2026. Solana.
12. “Punjab Police bust Pakistan ISI-backed smuggling network in Amritsar.” Akashvani News. Retrieved October 1, 2026. Akashvani News.
13. European Commission. (2016). “Communication on an action plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing” (COM(2016) 50 final). EUR-Lex. Retrieved October 1, 2026. EUR-Lex.
14. European Payments Initiative. (2026, September 16). EPI.
15. “New Delhi Declaration.” (2026, September 12). Press release. Retrieved September 18, 2026. PDF.
16. Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. Retrieved September 30, 2026. APSCO.
17. African Space Agency. “Member countries.” Retrieved September 30, 2026. AfSA.
18. United Nations. (2002). “United Nations treaties and principles on outer space.” UNOOSA (PDF).
19. BLIK. (2026, February 17). “Nearly 3 bn BLIK transactions in 2025 and over 2 m new users.” Retrieved October 2, 2026. BLIK.
20. Narodowy Bank Polski. (2025). “Polish Payment System Oversight Report for 2024.” Retrieved October 3, 2026. NBP (PDF).
21. European Commission. (2026, March 9). “Frequently asked questions on the digital euro and the legal tender of cash.” Retrieved October 3, 2026. European Commission.
22. European Central Bank. (2023, October 23). “Digital euro.” Retrieved October 3, 2026. ECB.
23. GUS. (2026, September 30). “Inflacja CPI we wrześniu rdr wyniosła 4,0 proc., a mdm 0,7 proc. — GUS (Tabela).” PAP Biznes. Retrieved October 2, 2026. PAP Biznes.

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